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The ‘Socratic Fallacy’ in Plato’s Early Dialogues
Priscilla K. Sakezies
Department of Philosophy
University o f Akron, Ohio
I. Introduction
In ‘Plato’s Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary’ (33), Peter Geach attributes two
assumptions to Socrates which he calls the ‘Socratic Fallacy’ since its locus classicus is the early Socratic
dialogues:
(A)
if you know you are correctly predicating a given term ‘T ,’ you must ‘know what it is to
be T ’ in the sense of being able to give a general criterion for a thing’s being T;
(B)
it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning o f ‘T ’ by giving examples o f things that are T.
Geach claims that (B) follows from (A) because assuming (A) is true, one cannot know that an instance of
T is really an instance o f T unless one already knows ‘what T is.’ Hence, examples will not help in the
search for a definition. (A) can also be called ‘the priority of definition principle’ because it essentially
claims that one must know the definition o f a term before one can know anything about that term.
The attribution o f this ‘fallacy’ to Socrates has provoked many scholars to come to his defense:
Vlastos, Santas, Beversluis, Woodruff, and Nehamas,1 for instance, deny that the Socratic Fallacy can be
found in the dialogues (although they have varying formulations of precisely what it is that Socrates does
not say). Most recently, William Prior argues that (A) does in fact occur in the dialogues, but rather than
being a fallacy it is ‘a perfectly innocent consequence of Platonic epistemology.’2 That is, for Plato, to
have ‘knowledge’ or episteme that something is T does require having a correct definition o f T. Prior
argues that this is a reasonable demand in the case of ethical terms such as ‘courage’ and ‘virtue’ and that
Geach sees this as a fallacy only because he assumes a W ittgensteinian conception o f knowledge in which
‘meaning is use.’3
I agree with Prior that Socrates does endorse (A) and that (A) is a consequence of Plato’s
epistemology. But I shall argue that Socrates ’ adoption o f (A) leads to problematic consequences which
Plato cannot accept and which he attempts to evade. Thus I argue for a developmental thesis. In the early
dialogues Plato via the character of Socrates makes many claims which together suggest that he holds (A)
to be true.4 At this stage of Plato’s philosophical development he cannot successfully define any ethical
term T and the consequence of this combined with (A) is that he cannot know anything about T. This
consequence commits Plato to a serious form of skepticism at this point. In the Meno, a transitional
dialogue in which Plato’s own views begin to replace those of Socrates, Plato still assumes (A) to be true
but Meno’s Paradox (80de) for the first time indicates explicit consciousness o f the consequences o f (A):
how can one even search for something one does not know at all? Plato’s response to this question—the
doctrine of recollection and then, in the Phaedo, the transcendence of the forms—is his way of avoiding the
skepticism to which Socrates is committed.
In section II, I shall survey the evidence for (A) in the Socratic dialogues, for I do believe it can be
found there, pace Vlastos et al. Then, in section III, I shall argue that the Meno is the precise point at
which Plato recognizes the problematic consequences of (A) and offers a multi-dimensional solution to this
problem.
Π. The Socratic Fallacy in the Definition Dialogues
The ‘Socratic Fallacy’ per se consists o f both (A) and (B). But my focus is (A) alone, which I
shall revise to a more comprehensive formulation: ‘to know that ...T—, one must know what the T (T-ness)
is.’5 This includes cases where T is subject, as well as cases where T is predicate; e.g. ‘justice is a virtue’
and ‘to benefit one’s friends is ju st.’ I prefer to call this assumption the priority of definition principle
(PD), which asserts that ‘if one fails to know what T-ness is, then one foils to know anything about T-ness’
(Benson’s formulation, 19), i.e., knowing the definition o f T-ness is a necessary condition for knowing
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anything about T-ness. The dialogues which provide evidence for (PD) are Republic I, Charmides, Laches,
Lysis, and Hippias Major.
The first instance o f (PD) is Republic I, 354bc: ‘the result o f our discussion for me is that I know
nothing; for, when I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it is a kind of a virtue or not,
or whether the ju st man is unhappy or happy. ’6 This is a fairly explicit statement of (PD). Vlastos,
however, claims that ‘tacked on at the end o f Book I, this cannot belong to the composition which precedes
it’ (1985, 26, n. 65). He argues that, in 351a, Socrates asserts ‘injustice is ignorance’ as a conclusion that
‘nobody could still not know,’ which implies that justice is knowledge, which implies that justice is virtue.
But this final conclusion contradicts 354c; therefore the latter must be ‘tacked on.’ This reasoning is
unpersuasive. In 354a-c, Socrates explains his dissatisfaction with the dialogue’s results: he begins by
inquiring into the nature of justice, but becomes sidetracked by questions about the attributes of justice.
354c shows that he thinks the digression is self-defeating because he cannot know the attributes o f justice
without first knowing the nature o f justice itself. This ending gives Republic I the same sort of aporetic
conclusion shared by all the Socratic definition dialogues. If the book had ended at 354a, with the total
success of proving that justice is more profitable than injustice, then Republic I would be very un-Socratic.
In short, the ending that Vlastos considers ‘tacked on’ is very appropriate to and characteristic of the
definition dialogues.
Additionally, it makes no sense, as Vlastos argues, for the ending to be tacked on. The only
reason a new ending would be added to Republic I is to smooth the transition to II-X, which most scholars
agree were written during Plato’s middle period. But 354bc, with its profession o f ignorance and despair at
not having a definition o f justice, is in direct conflict with the following nine books, where ‘Socrates’ knows
all sorts o f things, not the least o f which is the definition o f justice. Thus, it seems that the instance o f (PD)
at the close o f Republic I should be considered genuinely Socratic.
A second, though less explicit, instance of (PD) is Charmides 176a. Failing to find an adequate
definition o f sophrosune, temperance, Charmides says at the end:
But heavens, Socrates, I don’t know whether I possess it or whether I don't. Howcan I know it, when, on your own admission, not even you and Critias are able to
discover what on earth it is?
Apparently, the point o f this is that if one does not know what T is, one cannot even know whether one
possesses the quality of T. Vlastos argues that this passage provides no evidence for the Socratic Fallacy
because assumption (A) is not asserted ‘in full generality,’ i.e. it does not say that ‘if one does not know the
T one can’t know if anything whatever is T ’ (1985, 23, n.54).7 While he is correct that the assumption in
its most general form is not asserted in Charmides 176a, this criticism is not to the point. Charmides’
remark is a manifestation o f a larger claim; it is one variation on a Socratic theme. Thus, the absence of
the larger claim in a given passage does not prove that the passage is not an instance of that claim.
Beversluis, likewise, dismisses 176a as evidence for the Socratic Fallacy because o f its lack o f
generality. He says:
Charmides does not say that without a definition o f temperance he cannot know
that any actions are temperate but only that he cannot know whether he is
temperate~a remark which is nothing but a more emphatic reaffirmation of the
philosophically and psychologically intimidated state o f mind to which he had
already given ventât 159d 1-6. (214)
But again, Socrates’ expression o f (PD) by means o f particular instances is no evidence against the claim
that he holds the more general assumption. The whole point o f calling (PD) an ‘assumption’ is to indicate
that it is largely implicit in the dialogues and only occasionally manifests itself in passages such as those I
am now discussing. (PD) itself is, o f course, a scholar’s explanatory device; Socrates does not run around
saying ‘you can’t know that anything is T unless you know what T is.’ Furthermore, Charmides does not
strike me as being ‘philosophically and psychologically intimidated.’ Quite the contrary, Chaimides seems
well aware of the power o f his beauty and openly flirts with the mature Socrates in the closing scene,

playfully threatening violence to make Socrates ‘charm’ him and telling Socrates not to resist him (176a-d).
Although Socrates initiates this flirtation. Charmides’ playful response is not consistent with his being
psychologically intimidated.
Santas attempts to explain Charmides’ question at 176a by appealing to the context in which it
occurs:
When his more experienced elders had failed to discover and understand what
temperance is, it would have been unseemly and arrogant for Charmides to declare
in answer to Socrates’ question, ‘you two, and I too, do not know what
temperance is, but I certainly do know that I am temperate.’ (138)
This explanation trivializes Charmides’ remark and suggests that while he does believe that he possesses
the undefined virtue, he refuses to admit it. But perhaps we should take him more seriously. After all, he
does agree with Socrates that if sophrosune were in him, he should be able to say what it is (159a); so,
when he finds him self unable to define it, shouldn’t he genuinely wonder whether or not he possesses it?
To the above argument Santas adds, ‘And on top of all this, it is to be noted that the question, and
the implication that goes with it, is Charmides’ in this passage, not Socrates” (139). True, but these are
Plato’s words. Charmides’ closing remarks at 176ab are the dramatic conclusion o f the dialogue. If
Socrates disagrees with Charmides’ remarks or their implications, surely he would object. Socrates is not
reticent when it comes to pointing out others’ mistakes. His silence implies agreement. O f course, he has
no reason to disagree, for Charmides is expressing a Socratic assumption. The words could have been
Socrates’ ju st as well as Charmides’.
A third instance of (PD) occurs in Laches 190bc. In the Laches, Socrates is inquiring how to make
the sons o f Lysimachus and Melesias virtuous, but, in order to achieve this, they must first know what
virtue is. Socrates asks: ‘Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how' can we advise anyone
about the best mode of attaining something o f whose nature we are wholly (to parapari) ignorant?’8 This
rhetorical question clearly implies that one must know ‘what virtue is’ before one can determine how to
achieve it, which is another particular instance o f the assumption that to know that ...T—, one must know
what T is.
Vlastos (1985, 23, n.54) and Beversluis (215) again dismiss this passage for its lack of the full
generality of (A). But again I must reply that their criticisms are not to the point. Laches 190bc does not
assert (PD) per se, and no one claims that it does so, but it does manifest a particular instance of the
assumption. And the sum o f the particular instances does seem to suggest a more general viewpoint.9
A fourth occurrence o f (PD) is at Lysis 212a, where Socrates again implies that one must know
what T is before one can know howr to acquire T : ‘I’m so far from acquiring one that I don’t even know
how one man becomes the friend o f another. ’ And, after failing to define what a friend is, the dialogue
concludes with a fifth instance o f (PD) when Socrates says:
Lysis and Menexenus, we’ve now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like
me and you, since these people will go away and say that we think we’re friends o f
one another—for I consider myself one o f your number—though we were not as yet
able to find out precisely what a friend is. (223b)
This remark implies that one must know' what a friend is before one can even be or have a friend. Socrates
has made a fool o f himself insofar as he does think he is and has a friend but is unable to define a friend;
that is, he realizes that he is contradicting (PD).
Vlastos admits that Lysis 223b does assert that ‘if one does not know what the T is, one cannot
know if T is truly predicable o f anything whatever’ (1985, 23, n.54). (However, this admission seems
inconsistent with his denial that Charmides 176a instantiates (PD), since this passage is merely an instance
o f (A) as applied to friendship. Lysis 223b is more general than Charmides 176a, but it certainly is not (A)
in its ‘full generality.’) But Vlastos argues that Socrates’ assertion is either vacuous or false, depending on
how we read ‘know’ (1985, 26). Vlastos attempts to resolve the paradox of Socrates’ disavowal o f
knowledge by proposing a dual use o f ‘know’ in the early dialogues. When Socrates says he does not know
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anything, he means that he does not know anything with certainty, and Vlastos represents this type o f
knowledge as ‘knowledge,;.’ But when Socrates says or implies that he does know something, he means
that he has ‘elenctically justified true belief about that thing (i.e. his belief has not yet been elenctically
refuted), represented by ‘knowledge,.’ (1985, 18). Socrates does not then contradict himself when he
sometimes avows and sometimes disavows knowledge-he is merely using two distinct conceptions o f
knowledge.
Applying this distinction to assumption (A) (or my (PD)) Vlastos says:
If the question ‘is (A) true?’ had been put to Socrates in the elenctic dialogues it
would have required further specification. He would have needed to be told how
he should read ‘know’ in (A). Should he read it as ‘know /? If so, (A) turns into
(Ac)
If one does not knowc what the T is, one cannot knowc if T is truly predicable
of anything whatever.
Or should he take it in the alternative sense, reading it as
(Ae)
If one does not knowe what the T is, one cannot knowe if T is truly predicable
o f anything whatever.
...For the Socrates o f the elenctic dialogues, who has renounced knowledgec lock,
stock, and barrel, (Ac) would be vacuous: he has no interest in knowingc
anything... But now suppose, alternatively, that he had read (A) in the sense o f
(Ae). In that case he would have declared it false. Thus at [Ap. 29b 6-7] he
‘knows’ (=knowse) that he can predicate ‘evil’ and ‘base’ o f ‘doing injustice and
disobeying his superior’, though no definition o f either predicate has been assayed
and there is no good reason to believe that if it had been it would have met with
greater success than had any of those pursued in dialogues o f elenctic search...
Thus once the critical verb has been disambiguated, (A) is trouble-free for the
Socrates o f the elenctic dialogues: innocuous if read as (Ac), false as (A«). (1985,
25-26)
But why would we have to ask Socrates if (A) is true? He asserts it in various formulations, as we
have seen, as a truth. Vlastos’ ‘disambiguation’ o f the meaning o f ‘know’ does not disprove that Socrates
holds assumption (A); Vlastos ends up admitting that (A) is in the text (at least at Lysis 223b), but argues
that Socrates does not really mean it! That is, since Vlastos claims that Socrates has renounced
knowledgec, it must be (Ae) that Socrates asserts in the above-mentioned passages. But Vlastos says that
for Socrates (Ae) would be false. Does this not put Vlastos in the position o f making Socrates contradict
himself, or assert something he does not mean (the very problem Vlastos’ ‘disambiguation’ purports to
solve)? Vlastos’ dichotomy may resolve some textual problems and it may even resolve the paradox o f
Socrates’ disavowal o f knowledge (although I do not think so10). However, Vlastos’ application o f it to the
Socratic Fallacy makes Socrates’ assertions of die aforementioned instances of (A) incoherent. Regardless
o f precisely what sense we give to ‘know,’ I believe that we should take Socrates more seriously when he
asserts (A), instead o f trying to explain it away at any cost.
A sixth, and very explicit, assertion of (PD) occurs at the close o f Hippias Major, after Socrates
has failed to define to kalon, the fine. He says o f his alter-ego:
he asks me if I am not ashamed o f my effrontery in discussing fine occupations,
when questioning shows how obviously ignorant I am even about what fineness
itself is. ‘And yet,’ he continues, ‘how can you know whose speech or other action
is finely formed, if you’re ignorant about fineness? Don’t you think you might as
well be dead, in such a condition?’ (304de)
The point here is quite obviously that without knowledge o f ‘what fineness is,’ one cannot know whether
anything is or is not fine. This is (PD) in its full generality. In his commentary on this dialogue. W oodruff
states the Socratic Fallacy as ‘supposing that a person cannot use a word correctly unless he can define it’
(139) and denies that Socrates commits it. He says that Hippias Major 304de commits Socrates to
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believing that ‘knowing the definition o f the fine is prior to knowing o f anything that it is fine’ (140), which
is also how I read the passage. But what W oodruff posits as the Socratic Fallacy is a much weaker version
o f (PD), whereas the thesis he admits Hippias Major does assert is an instance o f what I am calling (PD).
Therefore, W oodruff does believe that Socrates holds (PD) in this dialogue. The difference between
W oodruff1s version of the Socratic Fallacy and (PD) is that between using a term T correctly and knowing
that ...T -.
Vlastos attempts to dismiss 304de as another instance of (Ae) which Socrates considers false
(1985, 24-26), but as the rebuke is coming from the lips of his alter-ego, Socrates certainly accepts it as
true. The final question, in fact, suggests that Socrates (or Plato) is aware of the deadly serious
consequences of (PD).11
Socrates seems to recognize how problematic (PD) is in that he himself does at times make claims
about T without having a definition for it. However, this contradiction is not evidence that Socrates does
not hold (PD), but rather manifests the difficulties inherent in Socrates’ manner of seeking definitions. He
believes that all particular instances of T have something in common, some immanent quality, by virtue o f
which they all are T: this quality is ‘the T ’ or ‘T-ness.’ His criteria for an adequate definition of the T
require that definiens and definiendum be co-extensive. Unfortunately for him, this requirement proves
impossible to satisfy (at least for ethical terms; Socrates can define ‘shape’ and ‘color’ to his satisfaction,
Meno 76a-d). So, as long as Socrates holds definitional knowledge to be a necessary condition for knowing
that an ethical term applies to any particular case, he cannot know whether or not the term applies. This is
o f course a difficult predicament to put oneself in, as Plato seems to recognize in the Meno (to be addressed
below).
The evidence o f the passages I have discussed indicates that assumption (PD) can be found in the
Socratic dialogues. Much of scholars’ criticism against the Socratic Fallacy is really directed against
Geach’s assumption (B), that ‘it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning o f “T” by giving examples o f
things that are T. ’ Santas, for instance, argues against Socrates’ holding assumption (A) primarily by
showing that he does not hold (B), which he, following Geach, believes is entailed by (A). But Santas
proves that Socrates does not hold (B) merely by indicating his frequent use o f examples. Santas is
perfectly correct that Socrates accepts and uses examples in searching for definitions. Socrates does not
object to examples o f a definiendum per se; he only rejects them as adequate definiens. However, Prior
argues persuasively that (A) does not entail (B), the claim that it is no use trying to find a definition o f T by
giving examples o f things that are T. This is because.
It is a perfectly intelligible procedure, one followed in all forms of classificatory endeavor, to
consider many alleged examples of a given term in the hope o f coming up with a general criterion
or general criteria o f classification. Once one has developed or discovered such criteria, one can
then use them to sort through the initial set of alleged examples and separate those that truly belong
to the class from those that merely appear to. ( I l l )
So considering alleged examples o f T can be useful in discovering the definition o f T. However, what (A)
does entail is that ‘one cannot know that än alleged example of T is a genuine example’ until one knows the
definition o f T (ibid., 110). And this is problematic for Plato.
The problem which Plato via the character of Socrates occasionally seems to notice is that his and
others’ knowledge claims conflict with his assumption about the priority of definition. Laches says that he
likes to hear a man who is in tune with his words, who lives by his principles (Laches 188c-e). After
several failed attempts to define bravery, Socrates tells Laches that they must not be ‘tuned,’ because their
words and actions do not harmonize:
If people judged us by our actions, they might well say that we had our share o f
bravery; but to judge from this conversation, I don’t think they would if they could
hear us discussing it. (193e)
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This and similar passages (e.g. Lysis 223b, Hippias Major 304de) suggest that Socrates is cognizant o f a
conflict. If he is aware o f it, and Plato takes steps in the Meno specifically to resolve this conflict, why
should we, his readers, be so eager to deny that there is a problem?
III. The Socratic Fallacy in the Meno
Next, I propose to examine the role this assumption plays in the Meno, which I take to be
transitional between the early dialogues in which Plato reports Socrates’ views and method and the middle
dialogues in which Plato’s own method and metaphysics are voiced through Socrates’ persona. (PD)
appears to be affirmed several times in the Meno, yet after failing to define virtue, Socrates agrees to
inquire whether virtue is teachable—a task he is not warranted in attempting if he still holds to (PD)—if he
can use a new hypothetical method. Meno’s Paradox explicitly confronts us with the consequences o f (PD)
and Plato’s doctrine of recollection is offered as a solution to this problem. Yet another Platonic
innovation, the view that true belief alone is sufficient for correct action, and hence for virtue, also seems to
address the impasse Socrates finds himself in due to assuming (PD). Thus, the Meno simultaneously
affirms the priority o f definition principle, recognizes its problematic consequences, and offers a multi
dimensional solution.
The Meno opens with Socrates ironically praising Meno for his wisdom. Socrates contrasts
Meno’s teacher, Gorgias, who has a ready answer for any question, with the Athenians as a whole. If any
Athenian were asked whether virtue w7ere teachable, he would respond: ‘Good stranger, you must think me
happy indeed if you think I know whether virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from
knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any {to parapan) knowledge of what
virtue itself is’ (71a). Although this clear instantiation of (PD) is attributed to the Athenians at large,
Socrates immediately claims the assumption for himself:
I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens in this matter, and I blame myself for my
complete (to parapan) ignorance about virtue. If I do not know what something is (ho ti esti), how
could I know what qualities it possesses (hopoion ti <esti>)l Or do you think that someone who
does not know at all (to parapan) who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or
well-born, or the opposite of these? (71b)
This explicit formulation of (PD)—if one fails to know what T-ness is, then one fails to know7
anything about T-ness—echoes the occurrences in the earlier dialogues discussed above. What is strikingly
new is the explicit and thrice-repeated qualification to parapan. This adverb occurs only a few times in the
early Socratic dialogues, but nearly 150 times in Plato’s later works (most occurrences are in the Laws).
Interestingly, in the Laches passage where (PD) occurs ( 190bc, discussed above), to parapan is used
exactly as it is in the Meno. Socrates there asks: ‘Then must we not first know the nature o f virtue? For
how can we advise anyone about the best mode o f attaining something of whose nature we are wholly (to
parapan) ignorant?’ In more general terms, if one does not know at ail what the T is, one cannot know7
anything at all about the T ’s qualities (e.g., whether it is teachable, how to get it for oneself). This is taken
quite seriously in the Laches and, like all the other early definition dialogues, this one is aporetic. No other
occurrence o f to parapan in the early dialogues (or elsewhere) is used to qualify a knowledge verb as in the
Meno.
I suggest that Plato repeats this assumption in the early dialogues as an authentically Socratic
view, but is by the Meno painfully aware o f its problematic consequences. So here the view is stated quite
self-consciously, the gist o f it being that a total, unqualified lack o f knowledge of a thing’s ‘what it is’ (ho
ti esti) results in a total ignorance o f that thing’s qualities (hopoion ti esti). But this suggests that some
sort or degree o f knowledge of (or acquaintance with, etc.) what a thing is may yield a corresponding
degree of knowledge o f that thing’s qualities. In other words, Plato’s set-up o f this assumption at the very
opening o f the Meno is deliberate and, while he still accepts the strong form to be true, he is searching for a
way around it.
(PD) may occur again at 79c. Meno defines virtue as the acquisition o f beautiful things
accompanied by justice or some other part o f virtue, but Socrates points out that they have made no
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progress in defining virtue itself. He asks, ‘do you think one knows what a part o f virtue is if one does not
know virtue itself?’ Socrates may simply be indicating the fallacy of circular definition, i.e., that the
definiens cannot contain the definiendum. But it may also manifest another occurrence of (PD): one
cannot know the ‘what it is’ o f justice unless one knows the ‘what it is’ of virtue, since justice is a part of
virtue.12
(PD) comes into play a third time in Meno’s Paradox at 80d. After several unsuccessful attempts
to define virtue, Meno complains that although he has made many fine speeches about virtue, now he
cannot even say what it is~Socrates has transferred his own state o f being at a loss or in doubt (aporein) to
Meno. Yet Socrates still wants to continue the search for ‘what virtue is’ despite both parties’ lack of
knowledge. Now Meno objects:
How will you look for i t , Socrates, when you do not know at all (to parapan) what it is? How
will you aim to search for something you do not know <at all>13? If you should meet with it, how
wall you know that this is the thing that you did not know? (80d)
Note that to parapan recurs here for the fourth time. Socrates restates this paradox:
Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for
what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he
knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to
look for. (80d)
This problem seems to be a direct consequence o f the priority of definition principle. Socrates’
goal is to make men who think they are knowledgeable, recognize that they do not in fact know, thus
making them eager to search for knowledge. At this goal, Socrates was successful. But he never actually
succeeds in finding the sort of definitions he seeks and perhaps this is unimportant to him. We may never
know how skeptical Socrates the man actually was, but the evidence from the early dialogues suggests that,
for him, exposing ignorance is much more important than attaining positive knowledge. After recording so
many aporetic dialogues, however, Plato seems to tire o f Socrates’ repeated failures. Perhaps Meno’s
criticism is really Plato’s realization that he will never be able to find the ‘what it is’ o f virtue, justice,
beauty, etc., as long as he continues to follow Socrates. Here, in the Meno, ‘Socrates’ escapes Meno’s
Paradox and the consequences of (PD) by the doctrine of recollection, a Platonic innovation.
Socrates does not deny the truth o f Meno’s criticism, despite his acknowledgement that the
argument does not seem to him to be well-stated (81a). Rather than saying Meno’s paradox is false, i.e.,
just denying it, Socrates offers recollection as a way around it. Socrates affirms as a true conditional that
if we have no knowledge of a thing whatsoever, then we can know nothing about it (i.e., what sort o f thing
it is, hopoion ti esti), and hence cannot even begin to search for it. But he now, for the first time, denies
the antecedent: in a way, we do have knowledge. The doctrine o f recollection is his attempt to explain in
what way we have it and how it can be extracted from the soul. If we were dealing with the epistemology
of the Republic, it would be impossible to know something ‘in a way:’ there the only objects of knowledge
are forms and there seems to be only one degree o f knowledge o f them—either one knows the forms or one
does not. Belief, on the other hand, is of the sensible world, which cannot be known (529c), giving us an
ontological and epistemological dichotomy. In the Meno, however, belief and knowledge are of the same
object, the difference is that a true belief which is tied down ‘by giving an account o f the reason why’
becomes known (97e-98a). Hence, in the Meno, there are degrees between belief and knowledge.
After explaining to Meno how' learning is really recollection, Socrates wants to launch into a
second attempt to ‘recollect’ what virtue is. Meno however insists on inquiring whether virtue is teachable,
which is after all his original question. Socrates then seems to affirm (PD) again (the fourth time by my
count) when he tells Meno that they should not investigate whether virtue is teachable before investigating
what virtue is. But he gives in to Meno, saying ‘So we must, it appears, inquire into the qualities of
something (poion to esti, what sort o f thing it is) the nature (ho ti esti, what it is) of which we do not yet
know’ (86e). Socrates agrees to do what he really should not do if he can begin the inquiry with a
hypothesis. This hypothetical method, which Socrates attributes to the geometers, is new in the dialogues.
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and in conjunction with other evidence in the Meno, it indicates a radical shift to a mathematical paradigm
o f investigation.14 This new method is presented as a direct solution to the problem o f seeking that o f
which one is totally ignorant. After explaining a geometrical example o f the hypothetical method, Socrates
says, ‘So let us speak about virtue also, since (epeide) we do not know either what it is (ho ti esti) or what
qualities it possesses (hopoion ti esti) and let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means o f a
hypothesis...’ (87b). By this method, instead of asking directly whether virtue is teachable (or now,
recollectable), they will ask whether virtue is a kind o f knowledge: if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught;
if not, then not, since only knowledge can be taught (87b-c).
As it turns out, Socrates claims that virtue is not knowledge nor is it teachable. In the course o f
arguing for this conclusion, Socrates expresses another Platonic innovation: true opinion alone is sufficient
for correct action and hence for virtue. The Meno concludes with the doctrine that virtue is neither taught,
nor a natural endowment, but is a gift from the gods. Not only poets and prophets, but also statesmen are
divinely inspired when they utter true opinions but lack nous (99b-100b). Socrates mentions no other
source o f our true opinions. At 85c, the slave boy is said to have true opinions ‘in him;’ 85e-86a seem to
say that since these opinions were not acquired in his present life the boy ‘had them and had learned them’
at a prior time ‘when he was not a human being. ’ All this suggests that Socrates thinks o f true opinions in
general as divinely bestowed, though divine dispensation may consist of whatever happens to souls
between incarnations.13 The turning of opinion into knowledge, however, is a human activity, achieved by
the dialectical process exemplified in Socrates’ lesson to the slave boy. This is the process o f ‘tying down’
true opinions by giving an account of the reason why, which, Socrates says, is recollection (98a).
Socrates’ closing remarks are again suggestive of (PD). After concluding that virtue is a gift from
the gods, he says, ‘We shall have clear knowledge o f this when, before we investigate how it comes to be
present in men, we first try to find out what virtue in itself is’ (100b). This is not nearly as strong as (PD)
nor as negative. Rather than claim that knowing the ‘what it is’ is a necessary condition for knowing a
thing’s qualities, Socrates now says that if we search for what virtue is in itself (auto hath ’ hauto), we will
affirm what we have already discovered via the hypothetical method. While this still stresses the priority of
definition, it no longer requires it unconditionally.
IV. Conclusion
In the Meno, we find Socrates espousing many doctrines unheard of in earlier dialogues. The
doctrine o f recollection and the immortality of the soul are the centerpiece o f the Phaedo, but recollection is
dropped until a brief recurrence in the Phaedrus. The hypothetical method and the mathematical paradigm
are most important in the Republic, where Plato proposes to define the just man on the hypothesis that he is
analogous to a larger entity, the just state. Also vital to the Republic is the view' that true belief is sufficient
for virtue (even craftsmen and soldiers can be virtuous, but only guardians have knowledge), although as
noted above, Plato is dualistic in his epistemology and ontology due to his theory o f forms. (PD), however,
does not recur in any Platonic dialogue (assuming Republic I to be early). The abandonment of this
assumption coincides with Plato’s abandonment o f Socratic skepticism and his embracing o f his own
peculiar dogmatism. The Meno records a moment of intellectual turmoil in Plato’s thought, when he is
pulling away from the Socratic views he has been recording and is struggling to find his own way. In this
dialogue, Plato affirms the priority o f definition principle as a true conditional (if one has no knowledge
whatsoever o f ‘what a thing is,’ then one can know nothing about that thing’s qualities) but he now denies
the antecedent. Meno’s Paradox illustrates the skeptical consequences of (PD) and Plato’s new views on
recollection, the hypothetical method, and true belief offer a way out o f Socratic aporia.
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’See References.
2 ‘Plato and the “Socratic Fallacy,”’ Phronesis 43 (1998), 97.
3 Ibid., 102.
41 hold the standard view that in the ‘early’ dialogues Plato expresses and endorses the views o f the
historical Socrates. My argument, however, need only assume that the early dialogues express Plato ’s
early views, which he ammended as his thought developed.
5 Where ‘...T—’ represents any sentence in which T occurs. ‘To know what the T is’ consists of having the
sort o f definitional knowledge that Socrates sought in the definition dialogues.
61 use the following translations: G.M.A. Grube’s Republic and Meno (the latter from his Plato: Five
Dialogues)·, Benjamin Jowett’s Laches (from The Collected Dialogues o f Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton
and Huntington Cairns); Donald W att’s Charmides and Lysis, and Robin W aterfield’s Hippias Major
(from Early Socratic Dialogues, edited by Trevor J. Saunders).
71 change Vlastos’ ‘F ’ to ‘T ’ for the sake o f consistency within this paper.
8 The significance o f to parapan will be discussed in section HI.
9 This is exactly Benson’s point in his excellent paper ‘The Priority o f Definition and the Socratic
Elenchus,’ 22-44.
10 See Lesher for a persuasive critique of Vlastos’ ‘disambiguation;’ but he agrees with Vlastos that the
Socratic Fallacy (he calls it ‘Geach’s Paradox’) does not occur in the Socratic dialogues. Yonezawa also
rejects Vlastos’ solution and offers an interesting alternative.
” Brickhouse and Smith think this is a hyperbole (29), but it may presage Plato’s view in the Phaedo:
‘wisdom,’ true knowledge o f things in themselves, can be attained only after the death of the body, which is
an impediment to knowledge (66a ff).
12 O f course, we should ask how he knows that justice is a part o f virtue, since (PD) really commits us to
skepticism, but that is another problem.
13 to parapan does not occur here; Grube’s translation is a bit misleading.
14 See Vlastos’ ‘Elenchus and Mathematics’ for a persuasive argument for this claim.
15 Even if Plato did believe this at the time he wrote the Meno, there is no evidence that he had worked out
the details. While it may be possible to extract from the Meno a fairly clear account o f the process o f
recollecting a piece of knowledge, Plato is very sketchy about what happens before birth.

